A brief history of police ICT

Nick was asked by COPACC to write the introduction to their forthcoming thematic on technology in policing. So he wrote this brief history.

The chamber of the House of Commons was almost deserted when the Member of Parliament for the Vale of Glamorgan stood up to initiate the debate on Police ICT. He had much to say. He expressed anxiety that sophisticated criminals were at risk of using technology to outpace the police. He reported back on a visit to the US and his admiration for the way that the officer he’d accompanied in Seattle had the technology to give him access to the full story in a way that wasn’t the case in the UK. He turned his attention to the Criminal Justice System, suggesting that “Information such as charge sheets, lists of previous convictions and advance disclosure could be transmitted to the court, the Crown Prosecution Service, the defence solicitors and the probation service—as necessary—electronically and at the touch of a button, thereby avoiding delays and reducing the need for court adjournments.”

The discussion on ICT in British Policing is seldom new. And it owes much to history.

The minister’s response was conciliatory and reassuring: “The Government are committed to ensuring that the right technology is available to the police where and when it is needed. All forms of technology are being brought to bear in the constant fight against crime…” No-one would bat an eyelid if this reported debate had taken place last week, but of course it didn’t: it happened on 30 November 1995. The discussion on ICT in British Policing is seldom new. And it owes much to history. 

There’s more than one way of putting policing arrangements in place in a country. You can have a constellation of local enforcement agencies (the USA has roughly 17000), you can have a mighty, single, central force, or you can have twin bodies to keep an eye on each other as well as on the community – as Napoleon chose to do in France. Whatever choice you make (or made – as most of these decisions were taken almost 200 years ago) will, of course, have consequences. National structures have the advantage of promoting consistency and economy of scale whereas local structures offer responsiveness and a sense of meaningful influence to the citizen. But as we embark on CoPaCC’s thematic review of Police ICT, there is no escaping the fact that the structure of British Policing has had deep-rooted and far-reaching consequences for the technology landscape that we are reviewing.

Policing in England and Wales is – and has always been – a fundamentally local activity. The original Borough forces have undergone two major rounds of consolidation – the most recent in the early 1970s – but the idea of a locally responsive and locally accountable police service is very dearly cherished. In many ways, it produces immense benefits but it puts substantial obstacles in the way of those charged with leadership of the ICT function.

At the birth of the modern police service, national considerations were few in number. Local forces got on with the business of policing and – apart from the odd occasion when a particularly complex, gruesome or notorious crime would necessitate the deployment of a few detectives from Scotland Yard out to the counties – it was contained within county or city boundaries. But in the 1960s an increasingly mobile criminal threat drove officers into cars and led to the creation of Regional Crime Squads. The practice of police control rooms making telephone calls to one another to find out what was known about a particular individual felt anachronistic and untenable and in 1974 the Police National Computer was born.

Development of information systems

A source of pride to officers up and down the country, the PNC was a development that proved that policing was some way ahead of the general population when it came to new technology. That development was eclipsed the following year when ministers proudly announced that every police officer in the UK was now equipped with a personal radio. The police service maintained its reputation for technological leadership with the deployment of HOLMES – the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System and the world-leading use of DNA to secure the conviction of Colin Pitchfork in Leicestershire for the murder of two young girls.

By the mid-1990s, a National Strategy for Police Information Systems had been embarked on and while the Police Minister, speaking in the debate referred to above, may not have liked the acronym (which he referred to as NatSPIS), he certainly liked the direction of travel. Indeed, he used that speech in Parliament to herald the creation of the new Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO). “The police will be in the driving seat,” he added, “not the bureaucrats or me”.

.... police ICT compared favourably with the technology available to private citizens – but not so favourably in comparison to the world of work, particularly at the front line

But as pride and optimism grew, there were some worrying signs. Yes, police ICT had compared favourably with the technology available to private citizens – but not so favourably in comparison to the world of work, particularly at the front line. A television audience of millions watched Sir John Harvey-Jones, the former CEO of the petrochemicals giant ICI, lambasting South Yorkshire Police for the absence of technology in its police stations. And subsequently, Sir John (now Lord) Stevens and TV presenter Nick Ross followed a similar line when jointly presenting the Police Foundation lecture in 2000: “There must be a huge new emphasis on data analysis and computers. This is even more important than bobbies on the beat…. But we waste so much of the time and energy of the bobbies we have. Compared to many industries, the police have primitive IT…” Notwithstanding the creation of a national DNA database in 1995, a national Fingerprint Identification System in 2001 and the completion of the roll-out of digital communications to the service (through Airwave) in 2005, there was still a sense that the service was lagging behind.

Sharing intelligence

The murder of two schoolgirls in Soham, Cambridgeshire in 2002 led to immense soul-searching across the service about the continued inability of forces to share intelligence electronically. Sir Michael (now Lord) Bichard led an inquiry into events surrounding the murders and made 31 recommendations, including the key requirement for a national intelligence system for the police in England and Wales. Suddenly there was energy, resource and focus in plentiful supply. The Home Secretary at the time David (now Lord) Blunkett reprised an ambitious theme that was now becoming familiar “to be able to transform what the police can do. The ways that laptop computers can be used (that are commonplace elsewhere) with proper training… they can be linked to the mainframe so that from the moment of arrest through to court hearings and beyond we can use the same databases.”

And the words were backed up by resources – huge resources. A review of PITO, which had never fully lived up to the ambitious billing it had been given (and which had, in some quarters, earned the cynical strap line “Yesterday’s Technology, Tomorrow”) concluded that it should transform itself – and become part of the new flagship body the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), which was to launch in 2007.

Meanwhile, as these national developments played out, individual forces spent the 1990s and 2000s computerizing many of their activities. Much, if not most, of what an individual officer saw on a day to day basis was procured or developed locally, as first the control room, then the custody office and finally the CID office and briefing room saw the appearance of successive computers, with their bright green and black screens, in the corner. For almost all officers, a computer was a daily reality in the office – if not yet at home.

A localist (some would say parochial) mindset, the inherent conservatism of policing and the requirements of the criminal justice system combined to ensure that the first force systems tended to be no more than precise electronic replicas of the paper systems they replaced.

Forces tended to develop their IT capability locally: the era of energetic collaboration was not yet born. As a result, most forces did not represent an attractive proposition to larger technology companies: a situation made more pronounced by the tendency of forces to insist on different local configurations for even the same basic systems that would perform fundamentally similar tasks. A localist (some would say parochial) mindset, the inherent conservatism of policing and the requirements of the criminal justice system combined to ensure that the first force systems tended to be no more than precise electronic replicas of the paper systems they replaced. Some of them still are. Many systems were developed by officers with a yen for technology – some of whom then left the service and have made an excellent living from it ever since.

This approach denied the service the best of breed solutions that quickly became industry standards elsewhere. As other industries converged around common processes, delivered through Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) solutions, the police continued to produce a succession of free-standing, ingenious, individual solutions to individual issues – from CCTV management to Fixed Penalty Notice Processing and from Firearms Licensing to Case File Preparation. The result, at the birth of the NPIA, was an annual spend of around £1.4 billion on police technology but a widespread – indeed almost universal - consensus that there had to be a much, much better way.

The National Policing Improvement Agency

The NPIA probably represented the high-water mark of British national policing ambition - in England and Wales at least. At its height, it had a staff of almost 2500, budgets approaching £500m and ambitions to transform policing from a position within policing. With post titles like “CIO for Policing” and “Chief People Officer for Policing,” the scale of that ambition was clear. And this was backed up by grand plans and strategies. Some of these, like the NSPIS that the minister had likened to weak tea, were brought forward from earlier bodies whereas others – the National Improvement Strategy for Policing (NISP) and the Information Systems Improvement Strategy (ISIS) were brand new. But for all the enthusiasm and gusto of their proponents, too many of the programmes suffered from a lack of support. However rational the objectives of the programmes might have seemed from Westminster (where it’s so much easier to take a strategic, long-term view) the required first steps often didn’t make sense in the context of this force, this morning. Such a sudden shift of power to the centre in policing had never been written into legislation, nor agreed by chief constables or Police Authorities.    

Then, like now, the service was struggling to resolve a technology legacy in which 2,000 systems operated across policing at a cost of £1.4bn.

ISIS was a good example. A massive programme, with many components, it ended up boiling down to five simple propositions which were conceived as a form of ‘convergence criteria’  – abandoning earlier attempts to micro-manage forces towards a more rational landscape. Then, like now, the service was struggling to resolve a technology legacy in which 2,000 systems operated across policing at a cost of £1.4bn. The programme advocated:

1. Aiming for national systems wherever possible and especially for new technology

2. Placing greater emphasis on common business processes across forces

3. Delivery in partnership – with an explicit role for the private sector

4. Migration to buying ICT as a service – with more pay per use contracts

5. A strong focus on delivering the easily achievable things first and incremental achievement thereafter.

Whatever the merits of this approach (and several components survive to this day with slightly altered labels), time had run out for the NPIA. It had achieved many things – from the delivery of the Police National Database to helping forces deal with the first icy chill of austerity and from the establishment of a central police procurement hub to the delivery of the Airwave communications system into the London Underground. But in the spring of 2010 it fell victim to its lack of support in the service in the face of a fiercely localist government with a giant amount of cash to save – after the previous administration had spent £700bn the previous year at a time when it only managed to raise £550bn in income.  

As the police service shrank by a fifth in size, a concerted effort was made to ensure that the operational technology available to the remaining officers was still the subject of investment.

As the political tide changed, policing got on with doing the same job with less money. And the absence of a guiding central strategy or integrated delivery mechanism didn’t prevent operational staff from feeling the benefit of useful new tools. Some of these – mobile data terminals, mobile identification devices and body-worn video - were supplied by their employers. Other capabilities – using a mapping tool to locate and incident or instant messaging of colleagues – were evidence of officers finding some of their own personal technology more useful than the kit they were provided with at work. Officers’ belts and vests became tougher and thicker as they were adorned with ever more individual devices, each proffering a new, separate, capability. As the police service shrank by a fifth in size, a concerted effort was made to ensure that the operational technology available to the remaining officers was still the subject of investment.

The Police ICT Company

The replacement for the NPIA’s technology function was conceived as a smaller, more dynamic, more commercial animal. The creation of a Police ICT Company was announced by Theresa May, then Home Secretary in 2011, who predicted “It will free chief constables from having to spend so much time on ICT matters while giving them better systems and better value for their ICT money.” The transition from the concept of the ICT Company in 2011 to the eventual realisation of the project some four years later was neither speedy nor straightforward. Along the way, many promises were made about what the company would do – from Police Minister Nick Herbert’s promise “to drive down costs, save taxpayers money and help to improve police and potentially wider criminal justice IT systems” in 2012 to the Home Secretary’s vision of “a gateway to private sector expertise, help drive innovation, share experience of best practice and the best technology available, and help secure better financial deals” in 2014.

The following year, the company’s chair, Nick Alston, offered “an agreed approach which will enable the efficient development of new systems, in particular ensuring the effective flow of information between forces”. About the same time, the company itself speculated that it could save the service “between £150 million and £465 million a year and improve policing.” Impressive.  What exactly it would do, practically and on a daily basis, was never completely clear – a situation not helped by a tendency of those associated with the company to say “tell us what you want us to do and we’ll do it”. But the speeches have always been clear about one thing – the Company will one day make things better.

It is a characteristic of the way policing procures its ICT that suppliers are often expected to provide bespoke solutions – meeting the very exact and exacting technology requirements of forces.

As forces have done their thing, and the ICT Company has started to find its feet, technology companies have had varying fortunes. Some – suppliers of the legacy systems that most agree have had it too good for too long – have probably been pleasantly surprised at how long they have been able to keep the tills ringing. Others have done well, not least smaller suppliers who have met the service’s surprisingly buoyant demand for large volumes of mobile operational technology and clever digital analytics. Some suppliers have seen exponential growth in the sector and have then used the powerful brand that is British Policing as a springboard for international expansion. It is a characteristic of the way policing procures its ICT that suppliers are often expected to provide bespoke solutions, meeting the very exact and exacting technology requirements of forces. This requirement has proved attractive to some, whereas others, including several very large technology companies and systems integrators, have flirted with the idea of selling to policing before deciding that the sector is too complex, too impenetrable and simply too difficult – and walking away.

Forces, detecting an absence of political direction and content to live without powerful overarching national structures, looked for other ways to achieve consolidation and economies of scale. Generally, this was achieved through collaboration, effectively the only option left on the table since Home Secretary Reid killed off the idea of force mergers in 2006. On the one hand, collaboration has undoubtedly protected the front line, with millions of pounds having been taken, relatively less painfully, out of support functions through reducing management overhead. On the other hand, the nature of collaboration has produced an even more complex landscape as forces have each made their own selection from a menu comprising strategic partnership, full-region, sub-regional or cross-regional collaboration as well as place-based technology partnership (with other statutory agencies) or commercial partnerships – or a combination. The only thing you wouldn’t want to do with the resultant landscape is unpick it.

Conclusions

The history of police ICT has its familiar themes and recurring ebbs and flows. It is undeniable that there have been times when British Policing has been at the forefront of technological advance in our society. Still less contentious is the claim that British Policing has generally been at the technological forefront of world policing.

".... one is left with a sense that more could have been done – with the result that police technology could have been made more interoperable, more affordable, more user-friendly and more capable if it was specified, procured, deployed and managed differently. "

But one is left with a sense that more could have been done – with the result that police technology could have been made more interoperable, more affordable, more user-friendly and more capable if it was specified, procured, deployed and managed differently. Some of these improvements might not be worth the price, as they are a by-product of the local accountability, responsiveness and integration that is the envy of the policing world. But it is perhaps worth understanding which are the characteristics of our policing that get in the way of smarter ICT, but which aren’t essential to the great British policing model.

A succession of good, talented, industrious people have come along and had a fresh look at this knotty problem. Most have been frustrated by the characteristics of the landscape which will always make collaborative progress difficult. Things like

• Fragmented spending

• The fact that policing finds it so very easy to change course – or indeed abandon a course - repeatedly

• The adherence to the myth of “omnicompetence:” the quasi-religious belief in what being a sworn police officer qualifies you to do (expressed without irony)

• The primacy of the local over the national in virtually all decision making

• A pervasive, irrational mistrust of private sector – and the consequent hesitant engagement with it

• Patchy quality in the management of contracts

• Short termism of national political leadership

• Speed of staff rotation, particularly in middle policing ranks

• Homogeneous background of senior officers (in which too many have reached their lofty position through the same – or similar - route)

• In the ‘innovation market,’ there are too many sellers and not enough buyers

There is hope. Throughout the period summarised here, the service has achieved several conspicuous successes in joining up the national policing effort. Some of these achievements had a strong technology component, some less so. But a number of common characteristics seem to be present with such regularity that they may potentially be regarded as precursors of success. Things like securing the active and early engagement of operational leaders (alongside ICT bosses). There is equal value in ensuring the end user plays a meaningful role in the ICT development process, not just in expressing a preference between solution A and solution B at the eleventh hour. It’s for that reason that the CoPaCC Review – and in particular the prominence it gives to the voice of the front line – is so welcome.

The centre also has a significant role to play, whether it likes it or not.

The centre also has a significant role to play, whether it likes it or not. Active ministerial support seems to be ever present in successful large police technology programmes. It also helps if the Home Office is closely involved – but not too closely: its track record on actual delivery of these programmes is poor. Civil servants have a habit of casually claiming credit for programmes they supported: “I built Terminal 5 at Heathrow” or “I closed down the Forensic Science Service” – but they mean something different to most people when they say it.

The biggest single precursor – whether it’s the rollout of Neighbourhood Policing, delivery of the Police National Database or the massive consolidation of national counter-terror capability post 7/7 – is the presence of a substantial financial incentive. It’s rival for the top spot is the presence of a pressing, unifying issue (or burning platform). The combination of the two bring out the very best in policing: “something needs doing right now – and we have the money to do it”.

Although the money may not be there – not to the extent that it once was anyway – there are many that think the platform is well and truly ablaze. Foremost among these is Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services. Its frustration with the service on this issue has bubbled and bubbled until it finally boiled over at the time of the publication of the Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy report for 2016. “Until the police service has a fully functional, interoperable system of ICT networks”, it warned, “efficiency and effectiveness are impaired, public safety is imperilled.”

It continued with the clear, passionate imperative, striking an almost biblical tone: “Forces must accelerate the move away from insularity and dissolve to nothing the barriers to sharing information. Criminals are more than capable of taking advantage of information highways, and it is essential that law enforcement does the same. In today’s digitally-connected world, interoperability is not just important: it is essential. Chief constables must fully commit to working collaboratively with each other and the Police ICT Company to bring about radical improvements to the use, design, interoperability and procurement of ICT systems.”

And in an echo of the arguments that prompted the creation of PITO in 1997 and the NPIA in 2007, it warned – on the eve of 2017 - “The absence of an effective collective decision-making mechanism at the national level militates against progress and leaves us with a culture of insularity, isolationism and protectionism. This is not to say that chief constables do not act in the interests of their forces and communities, but disseminating intelligence and common ways of working have not been high enough on their agendas.” Fasten your seatbelts, ladies and gentlemen, it may just be that another circuit is soon to begin…

This blog was originally published by Policing Insight, and sets the scene for the forthcoming COPACC thematic report on police ICT.